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Article 5

THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL SECURITY COURT
SYSTEM
GLENN SULMASY*

Thank you Professor, and special thanks to the Journal as well as Chris
Borgen for his kind invitation to have me here to speak - and to his expert
organization of this conference. The use of military commissions in the
war on al Qaeda has been, to say the least, unsuccessful and disastrous as a
matter of policy. Although some now advocate for the use of the Article III
court system to try terror suspects, such a policy would be equally
unsuccessful and potentially more problematic.
Our ability to
successfully-and humanely-detain and prosecute those who wish to
undermine our ideals will inevitably be an issue upon which history will
judge the great "American experiment." It now is clear that the best
approach is to reject the two prevailing rigid paradigms and pursue a more
flexible, realistic approach - a "third way" is needed. An alternative,
hybrid court system will be required to successfully deal with these
suspects in the future. In doing so, we remain on the right side of history,
restore our reputation abroad, and continue to make progress in the war on
al Qaeda.
THE CURRENT SITUATION

The West, whether we accept this reality or not, is fighting and engaged
in an armed conflict against violent, international terrorists. This is
exemplified by the current situation in Afghanistan, Iraq, parts of Pakistan,
numerous other areas of the world, and even in the homeland. Coalition
military forces have been largely successful on the battlefield against al
Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, however, the current war involves
* Glenn Sulmasy is an Associate Professor of Law at the United States Coast Guard Academy and
was a National Security and Human Rights Fellow at the Carr Center, Harvard Kennedy School. This
essay was created from a talk delivered at St. John's University School of Law in January 2008. He is
the author of The National Security Court System - A Natural Evolution of Justice in an Age of Terror
(2009). The views expressed herein are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of any of the
entities from which he is associated. The author would like to thank Gene Hamilton for his assistance in
the preparation of this submission.
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so much more than victory on the battlefield. Winning the war against al
Qaeda means the defeat of an ideology of hate, the removal of state
sponsors of terror, and the spread of democracy in new regions of the
world. We must also remember that defeating terrorists does not just mean
victory in combat, but victory for the rule of law, and the adjudication of
terror suspects within these very same processes of law. Again, although
the West has been largely militarily successful in action(s) against al
Qaeda, the road to justice in the courtroom has been a strategic shortfall.
The administration has long advocated, I and it has now become
exceedingly clear, that this conflict is dissimilar to those wars fought by
previous generations of Americans. Indeed, it is an armed conflict of some
sort, but again, not a traditional one. Al Qaeda fighters do not wear
uniforms, do not fight under a flag, and they certainly are not parties to any
of the conventions related to warfare that America and the rest of the
civilized world are bound by. America's enemies hide among civilian
populations, roam along international borders, target innocent civilian
populations with indiscriminate weapons of slaughter and chaos, and vow
to fight until the end. The military is constantly changing tactics and
adapting to be able to best combat the enemy. Although the fight against al
Qaeda and international terrorism involves the use of the American
military, unlike prior conflicts, the so called "war on terror" now involves
the FBI, the CIA, and even local law enforcement. The terrorist attacks of
September 11, as well as the ensuing fight against al Qaeda and other
terrorist organizations abroad, contributed to the largest reorganization of
the Federal government since the National Security Act of 1947,2 resulting
in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. 3
Rather than sitting in a "war room," planning the movement of large
brigades of tanks, plotting wide-scale aerial bombardment of enemy
territory, planning to control strategic areas on the high seas, and other
traditional tactics, today's war is being fought through use of the Terrorist
Surveillance Program, large scale intelligence operations, and even the
training of local police. Thus, the current military approach implements a
1 Donald H. Rumsfeld, A New Kind of War, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2001 available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspxspeechid=440 (describing the ways in which the
realities and resulting tactics employed in the global war on terror will amount to "a war like none other
our nation has faced").
2 National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (1947) ("In establishing this
legislation, it [was] the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of
the United States ....
").
3 Homeland Security Act of 2002 6 U.S.C.S. § II1 (2002) (establishing "a Department of
Homeland Security, as an executive department of the United States").
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hybrid model, one that involves both a military and a law enforcement
response. While these tactical changes have resulted in a great deal of
military success abroad, in particular the troop "surge" in Iraq,4 parallel
strategic adaptations have not taken place in America's legal approach to
fighting this war. Seven years later, America is using a universally
discredited military commission system to adjudicate suspected terrorists
held in Guantanamo. Simply put, perceptions matter in 2 1St century
warfare, or "fourth generation conflicts." The longer this system continues,
the more harm comes to America's reputation and credibility abroad on
other critical, humanitarian issues.
To best understand the administration's decision to try these suspects by
military commissions, however, it remains critical to remember the
perspective held by the vast majority of Americans immediately after
September 11, 2001. The American people and the administration were not
worried if another attack would happen, rather, it seems as though everyone
was more worried about when and where the next attack would take place.
The Bush administration and Congress acted quickly to authorize a military
response against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. 5 The
administration, Congress, and the American people, it seems, were more
concerned with preventing the next attack against innocent Americans and
shutting down al Qaeda operations in Afghanistan, than with the details
concerning how those members of al Qaeda would eventually be tried.
With the swift defeat of Taliban forces, and the concurrent detention of
terror suspects in Afghanistan and in other parts of the world, it quickly
became an issue as to how best to try those terror suspects held in the
6
custody of U.S. forces fighting a war abroad.
Rather than take the internationally unprecedented move of trying these
suspected "war criminals" or "enemy combatants" from other nations in
our own domestic federal courts, possibly along with the full panoply of
4 See Max Boot, The 'Surge' Is Working, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2007, available at
http://www.latimes.eom/news/opinion/la-oe-boot8sep08,0,1085443.story?coll=la-opinion-center
(noting that "there is no denying that events in Iraq have been moving in the right direction since the
surge started"). See also Alissa J. Rubin, Pointing to New Era, U.S. Steps Back as Iraqis Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, at Al (reporting that "Iraqis across the country voted Saturday [January 31, 2009]"
and that "Iraqi soldiers now handle all Green Zone checkpoints.").
5 See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(a) (2001). "[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States .... Id.
6 See Tim Golden, After Terror, A Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, at
1 (discussing the decision making process of key members of the administration in determining how
best to fight terrorism).
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rights that our judicial system affords (rights that would not be afforded to
POW's), the Bush administration made the determination that the best
approach to actually trying terror suspects was through the use of military
commissions. 7 Given this country's long history of using military
commissions-originating from the time of the Revolution, 8 the relative
inexperience in dealing with the detention of large numbers of non-state
actor warriors, as well as the existing Supreme Court jurisprudence on
military commissions, 9 such a determination seemed, and to a large extent
still seems, reasonable.
Some critics, however, have portrayed this
decision as having been concocted in the back room of the White House by
administration lawyers and policy makers. Nothing could be further from
the truth. The administration, along with those in the military, was
searching to find some means to move these cases forward and actually try
the detainees. In fact, the Executive Order of 2001,10 with all its faults,
provided more rights in many respects than did the orders of FDR for the
military commissions he implemented during the Second World War. The
decision to use military commissions, given the historical context, seemed
correct, and at the very least, reasonable to most serving within the Bush

administration.
While one can arguably understand the initial decision by the
administration to try these terror suspects in military tribunals, given the
context of the post 9/11 world, seven years later, it is hard to assert that this
approach has been successful. As a matter of policy it has been nothing
short of an unintended disaster. The use of military commissions has
become a lightning rod of criticism for the administration11 and the nation
7 Id. "Determined to deal aggressively with the terrorists they expected to capture, the [Bush
administration] officials bypassed the federal courts and their constitutional guarantees, giving the
military the authority to detain foreign suspects indefinitely and prosecute them in tribunals not used
since World War II." Id.
8 See Michael 0. Lacey, Military Commissions: A Historical Survey, 2002 ARMY LAW. 41, 42
(2002). In 1775, the Continental Congress "drafted the Articles of War for the Continental Army in
1775 .... [In part, this action] implemented the established tradition of the military commission with a
court of inquiry to try British officer and suspected spy - Major John Andre." Id. at 42.
9 See, e.g., Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942) (concluding that "§ 2 of Article III and the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments cannot be taken to have extended the right to demand a jury to trials by military
commission"); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 8 (1946) ("Ifthe military tribunals have lawful authority to
hear, decide and condemn, their action is not subject to judicial review merely because they have made
a wrong decision on decided facts. Correction of their errors of decision is not for the courts but for the
military authorities which alone are authorized to review their decisions.").
10 Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens
in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
11 See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, A Travesty of Justice, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 16, 2001, availableat
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res--9C05EI DE 143BF935A25752CI A9679C8B63
("President Bush's plan to use secret military tribunals to try terrorists is a dangerous idea, made even
worse by the fact that it is so superficially attractive. In his effort to defend America from terrorists, Mr.
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at large, hurting both our reputation and our ability to lead in other critical
areas internationally. To those who grew up in Navy or Coast Guard
families, the current reputation of the Guantanamo Naval Base is
particularly painful. Guantanamo, even as a military base, is severely
tarnished in the year 2008. During my youth in the 1980's, I vividly
remember my father speaking about Guantanamo as a beacon of human
rights within the totalitarian regime of Cuba and the Soviet Union. During
the Cold War, the Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay was looked upon as
being a base of freedom-as a base representing the nobility and strength
of the United States. It is both unfortunate and ironic that the international
community and much of the American public now views Guantanamo as
anything but a representation of the once embraced "shining city on a hill."
The criticisms have been vicious. Some of the criticisms are well founded,
but many are mired in hyperbole and exaggeration. Unfortunately, even
the well-respected non-governmental organization, Amnesty International,
termed Guantanamo in 2005 as "the gulag of our times."1 2 The United
States of America simply cannot permit the military commissions process
in Guantanamo to continue adjudicating war crimes against al Qaeda.
ARTICLE III COURTS

There are some, many of whom are here today at St. John's Law School
for this symposium, who advocate the use of the current civilian court
system to try these suspects.13 The civilian court system as established in
Article III of the Constitution, however, is not the appropriate system to
adjudicate these hybrid cases. There are numerous substantive and
procedural problems with trying terror suspects in Article III courts.
Bush is eroding the very values and principles he seeks to protect, including the rule of law."); William
Safire, Seizing DictatorialPowers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, available at http://query.nytimes.com/
gst/fullpage.html?res=9802E6DF163BF936A25752C1A9679C8B63 ("Intimidated by terrorists and
inflamed by a passion for rough justice, we are letting George W. Bush get away with the replacement
of the American rule of law with military kangaroo courts."); Michael B. Mukasey, Jose PadillaMakes
Bad Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2007, availableat http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=
110010505 ("[W]hen it is examined closely, [the trial of Jose Padilla] shows why current institutions
and statutes are not well suited to even the limited task of supplementing what became, after Sept. 11,
2001, principally a military effort to combat Islamic terrorism.").
12 Irene Khan, Speech Before the International Press Club, Amnesty International Report 2005
(May 25, 2005), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/assetIPOLIO/014/2005/en/domPOL 100142005 en.html.
13 See David Scheffer, What to do about America's Military Commissions, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
July 9, 2006 at 1. The problem of bringing alleged terrorists to justice after the Supreme Court shut
down the Guantanamo military commissions can, in part, be solved in two steps. First, "[w]e should
use a court-martial to prosecute the small number of prisoners of war at Guantanamo whose cases can
withstand the scrutiny of a fair trial. If a court-martial cannot be used, then we should bring prisoners to
the U.S. and prosecute them in federal criminal court as terrorists under U.S. anti-terrorism laws." Id.
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ConstitutionalCriminalProcedure
Applications of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the War on al
Qaeda are prime examples of reasons why this construct is as unworkable
as the military commissions have been (albeit for very different reasons).
Combat officers in Afghanistan and Iraq are not police officers - nor
should they ever be required to function in this capacity. They are there
overseas to fight and win wars. It is unreasonable to expect soldiers to
issue Miranda warnings to detainees, or require them to obtain search
warrants before searches or seizing evidence.
Simply, such law
enforcement requirements are not issues on the mind of soldiers fighting
stateless enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan who have evidence that could be
used for prosecutions later. Although these concerns would be unthinkable
seven years ago, since the Court's Boumedienel 4 decision, it is debatable
whether other Constitutional rights would be afforded to these suspects.
American soldiers should be concerned with combating the enemy, not
with providing Miranda statements upon the initiation of battle, or storming
an al Qaeda safe house and the subsequent detention of suspected terrorists.
Such notions are ludicrous.
Juries
Furthermore, consider the jury issues associated with trying the alleged
international terrorists in our Article III courts. Imagine the attempts made
to empanel an unbiased jury for any of these cases. A "jury of your peers"
in accordance with U.S. jurisprudence for trying Khalid Sheik-Mohamed
would be impossible within the continental United States. Additionally,
any juries would require lifetime protective details.
Judges
Also, it appears ill advised to use traditional Article III judges to make
determinations on such matters of nuanced and niche areas of the law, such
as the law of armed conflict, intelligence law, human rights law, etc. In
other areas of so called "niche law" - immigration, bankruptcy - we have
created separate court systems with specialized judges presiding. The
reality is that not all U.S. district court judges have the experience in the
law of war, intelligence law, international law, human rights, etc., that
would be required to properly conduct a trial for an alleged enemy of the
14 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
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United States (and part of an ongoing armed conflict). If we are serious
about using a civilian system to try the detainees, we need judges that are
versed in these areas of the law to preside.
Protective Details
Also, like the jury issues, the impractical reality of protecting judges has
emerged. The issues of judge protection may sound mundane right now,
but they are considerable in terms of cost and time, becoming more
important within the realistic framework of 21 t century jurisprudence.
Few would contend with the fact that judges trying these suspects would be
targets for future terrorist attacks. Using the existing district courts across
the country would require the adoption of new security procedures, massive
structural overhauls, additional security personnel, and the expenditure of
large amounts of money that the federal government does not have.
CivilianPrisons
Not only would the trial of these suspects in district courts present major
problems, the actual physical detention of these suspects using domestic
prisons is also highly problematic. It seems unlikely that many members of
Congress would actually volunteer to have these detainees moved from
Guantanamo Bay to their legislative districts. In fact, in July of 2007, the
Senate voted 94 to 3 to not move the detainees into the United States. 15
With all of the potential downsides of the current system and the
impracticalities of using the civilian court system, some wonder if there is
another way forward. Several scholars, from multiple sides of the political
spectrum, have continued to argue for creating some sort of a new terrorist
court - a national security court if you will. Those who desire the actual
trial of these suspects, the closing of Guantanamo, the protection of state
secrets, and the most efficient use of government resources-while still
upholding the Rule of Law and promoting human rights--can take comfort
in knowing that there is an effective alternative available.
THE WAY FORWARD

The President, Secretary Gates and Secretary Rice have all declared that
15 John M. Donnelly, Senate to Resume War Debate, CQ TODAY, Sept. 16, 2007, available at
http://public.cq.com/docs/cqt/newsl 10-000002584790.html. "In July [of 2007], the Senate passed, by a
vote of 94-3, a non-binding 'sense of the Senate' resolution declaring that detainees housed at
Guantanamo should not be transferred to facilities in the United States." Id.
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Guantanamo must close. 16 Virtually 80% of the members of Congress have
also declared that Guantanamo must close. Both major presidential
candidates have called for its closure. 17 The problem we face, however, is
what to do once we close the facility. It is easy now in hindsight to be
critical of the decision initially made by the administration and the way that
things are currently being handled, but America's next true challenge is to
devise a way in which to deal with these terror suspects that will gamer
respect and admiration both domestically and abroad. Similar to changes
in military strategy to win the war in Iraq and the war against al Qaeda,
where the recognition was made that this new type of conflict required new
tactics, the legal approach to handling terror suspects must change as well.
The solution is best seen through the lens of an evolutionary process,
developing over time from the period of the Revolution, through the Civil
War, through the First and Second World Wars and now into the realities
we face in 21st century warfare. The Order of November 13, 2001, with all
it warts and hairs, was undertaken with good intentions, but was later
struck down by the Supreme Court. Recognizing the importance of trying
these individuals, the President went to Congress for assistance, and
subsequently Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006,18
with warts and hairs of its own, but again making progress. A National
Security Court System seems to be the next logical step in the natural
progression of this "maturity" of justice. As we are fighting hybrid
warriors, in a hybrid war-a mix of law enforcement and combat-a
hybrid court should be created to adjudicate the alleged war crimes
committed by these hybrid warriors.
Obviously, the key is to balance the needs of national security and to
16 See, e.g., Reuters, Bush Speaks of Closing Guantanamo Prison, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2006,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/08/washington/08bush.html (noting that "President Bush
said yesterday that he would like to close the United States-run prison at Guantanamo Bay"); Thorn
Shanker & David E. Sanger, New to Job, Gates Arguedfor Closing Guantanamo,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/23/washington/23gitmo.html ("In his first weeks
as defense secretary, Robert M. Gates repeatedly argued that the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, had become so tainted abroad that legal proceedings at Guantanamo would be viewed as
illegitimate, according to senior administration officials. He told President Bush and others that it
should be shut down as quickly as possible.").
17 See, e.g., Elizabeth White, Obama Says Gitmo Facility Should Close, WASH. POST, June 24,
62 4
01
2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/06/24/AR20070
046.html (quoting Senator Obama as saying "'While we're at it we're going to close Guantanamo');
Philip Sherwell, Straight-Talking McCain Vows to Fix World's View of the 'Ugly American',
TELEGRAPH, Mar. 19, 2007, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/l545925/Straight
(reporting Senator
-talking-McCain-vows-to-fix-world%27s-view-of-the-%27ugly-American%27.html
McCain's statement that "'I would immediately close Guantanamo Bay, move all the prisoners to Fort
Leavenworth... and truly expedite the judicial proceedings in their cases."').
18 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub.L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
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achieve our simultaneous goal of promoting human rights. Attaining that
delicate balance is certainly critical. The success of this proposed new
court system will depend upon its acceptance by Congressional and
administration leaders who truly want to strike a balance between security
and the rule of law. Clearly, the devil will be in the details in creating such
a court through statutes.
The political branches have tough decisions to make in the next
Congress and Presidency when it comes time for the actual closing of
Guantanamo and the inevitable transfer of detainees. The most practical
way of detaining and adjudicating these cases is to locate the National
Security Court system on a number of military bases across the country.
Detention and physical security issues would still exist, but these bases
would be better suited to handle these situations than courts in downtown
districts in major cities within Congressional districts.
While the detention and trial of these suspects would take place on
American military bases, the key distinction from the existing military
commissions system is that military oversight of the process would be
transferred to civilian control. The Department of Justice would replace
the Department of Defense in this new system, and specialized Article III
judges would try the cases. The Justice Department would develop a pool
of litigators out of their national security division branch to prosecute the
suspects. Current military JAGs would defend the suspects with funding
provided by outside sources. Having the civilian Department of Justice
oversee the national security court is crucial to the success of the system
and would help restore America's image abroad. The new proposed
system would also remove the tainted impression that the rest of the world
receives by watching U.S. military officers in a U.S. military courtroom
adjudicate cases against quasi-warriors.
In this new system, the President would appoint the system's judges with
the advice and consent of the Senate. The judges would be life tenured
Article III judges, selected for possessing specialized knowledge of the
substantive law surrounding issues of terrorism and a high level of practical
experience.
Most importantly, the new system needs to be created as an adjudicatory
system rather than part of a preventative detention scheme. Others,
including my friend Ben Wittes, have argued in favor of using a national
security court for detention and preventative detention schemes. I oppose
this completely because using a national security court in this way would
only transport the familiar problems from Gitmo into the United States.
Trying the detainees in a properly constructed National Security Court,
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within a reasonable time frame, is the best means for the U.S. to regain
some moral authority in world affairs. The United States must be active in
ensuring that the cases go forward. The only way that the United States is
going to gain credibility within the international legal community is to
demonstrate that it is dedicated to the administration of justice and to
upholding the rule of law.
Additionally, the death penalty must be modified. Although not
prohibiting its use outright, the new system must be conscious of other
nations' views of this punishment. The system must, at least in some
fashion, recognize the laws of the home country of the person being
sentenced. Thus, if a citizen of Great Britain, where the death penalty is
illegal, is tried within the National Security Court, the death penalty would
not be a sentencing option. However, if a citizen of China, where the death
penalty is authorized, were within the system, such a sentence would be
available to the court. There are many other details about such a system
that could be elaborated upon, however, we must first acknowledge that the
current system is broken and make a conscious effort to move forward with
an alternative measure.
CONCLUSION

A new, statutorily created National Security Court system would afford
an opportunity for U.S. policy makers to respond forcefully and effectively
to both domestic and international calls for a way out of the myriad
problems associated with the current system. Rather than have no credible
solution, or merely engaging in attacks against the existing structure, policy
makers need to emerge with fresh new ways to look at the proper detention
and adjudication of captured al Qaeda fighters. It is time for the United
States to regain the initiative and reaffirm our leadership in the humane
prosecution of terrorists, a group that wishes to undermine the ideals of
democracy. There is no better way to protect the ideals of democracy than
to prosecute terrorists in a manner that is consistent with the democratic
ideals that they seek to destroy. At a minimum, the next administration and
Congress needs to create a commission to examine the possibilities that
such a National Security Court system might afford.

